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Advanced control rooms (ACRs) will utilize human-system interface (HSI) technologies that may
have significant implications for plant safety in that they will affect the operator's overall role and
means of interacting with the system. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews the
human factors engineering (HFE) aspects of HSIs to ensure that they are designed to good HFE
principles and support operator performance and reliability in order to protect public health and
safety. However, the oniy available NRC guidance was developed more than ten years ago, and does
not adequately address the human performance issues and technology changes associated with
ACRs. Accordingly, a new approach to ACR safety reviews was developed based upon the concept
of "convergent validity." This paper describes this approach to ACR safety reviews.
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) human-system interface (HSI) reviews have typically been
directed toward the unique control rooms (CRs) of individual nuclear power plants (NPPs) because
these plants and their CRs were already in existence at the time the reviews were performed. Detailed
plant designs were evaluated prior to making a safety determination. The NRC and the utility
industry have embarked on an effort to standardize future commercial NPP designs. The NRC has
issued 10 CFR 52 titled "Early site permits; standard design certifications; and combined licenses for
nuclear power plants," in order to achieve these objectives and streamline the licensing process. NPP
vendors have begun the design of advanced standard plants, which are being submitted to the NRC
for review and certification under Part 52. The General Electric Advanced Boiling Water Reactor,
Combustion Engineering System 80+, and Westinghouse AP600 are examples of designs undergoing
this type of review.
These designs will employ ACRs which, in comparison to those of conventional plants, utilize
increased automation and computer-based HSI technologies that will affect the operators' overall role
and their means of interacting with the plant. In addition to technology differences between ACRs
and conventional plants, one of the issues to emerge from the initial ACR reviews was that detailed
HSI design information was not available. In part because of rapidly changing technology, much of
the detailed HSI design will not be completed prior to the issuance of a design certification. Thus the
NRC is performing the design certification evaluation based on a process which describes the human
factors engineering (HFE) elements that are necessary and sufficient for the development and
implementation of an acceptable detailed design.
Since the review of a design process has not been performed in the nuclear industry in the past, and
the types of advanced technology employed in ACRs are significantly different from conventional
plants, criteria for ACR review are not adequately addressed by current regulations and review
guidance.I-2 Thus, the criteria for the review of a HFE design process and guidelines for the review of
the design product had to be developed. The HFE Program Review Model (PRM) and Advanced HSI
design Guideline, hereafter called the "Guideline," were developed to meet these objectives. In the
following sections, the issues that were considered in the development of the review criteria are
discussed followed by a discussion of the PRM and Guideline development.
ISSUES IMPACTING REVIEW METHOD DEVELOPMENT
In order to develop an approach to the evaluation of ACRs, it was necessary to consider issues related
to trends in advanced NPP design and related human factors issues.
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Diversity in Advanced Reactor Technology: The current generation of commercial NPPs operating
in the U.S. numbers more than 100; all of those are based upon light water reactor technology.
Although the next generation of plants will reflect advances on this technology base, the industry has
also developed designs based on different technologies, including heavy water, liquid metal, and gas-
cooled reactors. One important design initiative to improve safety and reliability has been the move
from "active" safety features (based upon active components such as pumps) toward more "passive"
safety features (based upon natural physical processes such as convection flow, radiation cooling, and
gravity). This plant diversity and the passive features introduce new and different systems for
operators to monitor, control, and test. These will result in different operator roles and tasks that must
be understood in performing safety reviews.
HSI Evolution: There are several important trends emerging in advanced HSI design concepts in the
nuclear industry, including: (1) increased automation changing the operator's role to system monitor,
supervisor, and automated system back-up; (2) centralization of controls and displays into "compact"
workstations; (3) use of large display panels visible from anywhere in the ACR to present high-level
information and critical parameters; (4) operator's interface with a data management system rather
than with components; (5) data integration and graphic displays; and (6) decision-support aids. As
these trends are implemented, they will result in a wide range of technological approaches to HSIs.
While the use of advanced technology is generally considered to enhance system performance,
advanced HSIs also have the potential to negatively impact human performance, spawn new types of
errors, and reduce human reliability.3-6 Despite its increasing utilization in complex systems such as
NPPs and aircraft, there is a consensus that further research is needed to understand the effects of this
technology on human performance and system safety. 7-8 With the trends in control room design,
cognitive issues are emerging as more significant than the physical and ergonomic considerations
which dominated the design of conventional HSIs. For example, increases in automation and poor
allocation of function decisions that occur early in the design process have been associated with a
shift from physical to cognitive workload, loss of operator vigilance, increase in human errors,9
difficulty maintaining adequate "situation awareness,"lo and decay of task performance skills when
required because of automated system failure. Thus, the National Academy of Sciences has
identified areas such as automation, supervisory control, and human-computer interface as high
priority research areas for the human factors community in general and for the commercial nuclear
industry in particular.7,s The review process should be sensitive to known and emerging human
performance issues and design considerations that give rise to them.
Guidelines to Support Design and Evaluation: For conventional plants, NRC CR reviews rest heavily
on an evaluation of the physical aspects of the HSI using HFE guidelines.2 In an ACR, the physical
layout of the display devices and computer input devices may be less important than the design of the
human-software interface. Information in ACRs can be presented in a complex network of hundreds
of displays. The difficulty of developing HFE guidelines for the adequate design of human-software
interfaces has been well documented.l_ Significant to the evaluation of human-software interfaces is
that many of the important design features are often hidden to the reviewer (and transparent to the
operator). For example, the observed display may be an end product of extensive data processing
and integration which results in higher-level, more abstract information than was the case in "single
sensor/single display" designs characteristic of conventional CRs). As a result, while hardware
guidelines tend to be relatively clear and specific, software guidelines tend to be stated in more
general language and have a considerably weaker research/experience base. Thus, an evaluation of
ACRs cannot rest on HFE guidelines alone.12-13 Weakness in a guideline-based evaluation will have
to be compensated for with other evaluation methods.
The issues discussed above have implications for the development of an approach to the safety review
of the HFE aspects of advanced reactor designs. First, an evaluation methodology should provide
guidance for reviews to be performed throughout the design process to final design and be sensitive
to HFE issues at each point. Second, evaluation methods will have to provide for the review of a broad
range of advanced HSI technologies. Third, reviews should extend beyond HFE guideline-based
evaluations and include a diversity of evaluation techniques. These factors have led to the technical
approach reflected in the PRM and Guideline development described in the following sections.
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HFE PROGRAM REVIEW MODEL
PRM Development
The general philosophy underlying the PRM's development is that "safety" is a concept that is not
directly observed but must be inferred from available evidence. When reviewing a design to make a
safety assessment, different types of information obtained from different assessment methods are
weighted towards or against an acceptable finding. Each method has its correlation with safety and
each has its own sources of bias and error. The reviewer would like to collect as much information as
possible in order to establish "convergent validity"14; i.e., to establish a coherent finding across
different evaluation methods. This approach is similar to a "defense-in-depth" concept applied to
HFE/HSI evaluation.
The types of information that can provide assessments of HSI safety include: (1) HFE Planning
including an HFE design team, program plans and procedures; (2) design analyses and studies
including requirements/function/task analyses, technology assessments, trade-off studies, etc.; (3)
design specifications and descriptions; and (4) verification and validation (V&V) analyses of the final
design, e.g., compliance with accepted HFE guidelines and operation of the integrated system with
operators performing the required tasks under actual (or simulated) conditions). The greatest
confidence in a finding that a design is safe can be obtained from one which was: (1) developed by a
qualified HFE design team using an acceptable HFE program plan; (2) the result of appropriate HFE
studies and analyses which provided accurate and complete inputs to the design process and to V&V
assessment criteria; (3) designed using proven technology based upon human performance and task
requirements incorporating accepted HFE standards and guidelines; and (4) evaluated with a
thorough V&V test program. The PRM was developed around this concept.
There were four specific objectives of the PRM development:
• to develop a model to serve as a technical basis for the review of the development and
design of HSIs that is (1) based upon currently accepted practices, (2) well-defined, and (3)
validated through experience with the development of complex, high-reliability systems;
• to identify the HFE elements in a system development, design, and evaluation process that
are necessary and sufficient requisites to successful integration of the human component in
complex systems;
• to identify which aspects of each HFE element are key to a safety review and are required
to monitor the process; and
• to identify the types of acceptance criteria by which HFE elements can be evaluated.
To meet these objectives, a technical review of current HFE guidance and practices was conducted
along two dimensions: Technical Basis (literature providing the theoretical and regulatory basis for
evaluating the conduct of HFE); and Application (literature reflecting the practice of HFE for
development, design and evaluation of complex, high-reliability systems). General systems literature,
as well as literature focused specifically on the nuclear industry, was reviewed. From this review a
generic system development, design, and evaluation process was defined. Once specified, key HFE
elements were identified, and general criteria by which they are assessed (based upon a review of
current literature and accepted practices in the field of human factors engineering) were developed.
The PRM was based largely on applied general systems theory15-16 and the DoD system development
process which is rooted in systems theory.17 Applied general systems theory provides a broad
approach to system design and development based on a series of clearly defined developmental steps,
each with clearly defined goals and with specific management processes to attain them. System
engineering has been defined as "...the management function which controls the total system
development effort for the purpose of achieving an optimum balance of all system elements. It is a
process which transforms an operational need into a description of system parameters and integrates
those parameters to optimize the overall system effectiveness."17
The effective integration of HFE considerations into the design is accomplished by: (1) providing a
structured top-down approach to system development which is iterative, integrative, interdisciplinary
and requirements driven, and (2) providing a management structure which details the HFE consider-
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ations in each step of the overall process. A structured top-down approach to NPP HFE is consistent
with recent nuclear industry standards for advanced control room designlSd9 and with the recognition
in the nuclear industry that human factors issues and problems emerge throughout the NPP design
and evaluation process. The systems engineering approach was expanded to develop a PRM to be
used for the advanced control room design and implementation process review by the incorporation
of NRC HFE requirements.
PRM Description
In this section an overview of the PRM is presented to generally describe the HFE elements, the
products reviewed for each element, and the acceptance criteria used to evaluate the element.
The PRM is intended as the programmatic approach to achieving a design commitment to HFE. The
overall commitment and scope of the HFE effort can be stated as follows: Human-system interfaces
(HSI) should be provided for the operation, maintenance, test, and inspection of the NPP that reflect
state-of-the-art human factors principles. For the purposes of PRM development "state of the art"
human factors principles were defined as those principles currently accepted by human factors
practitioners. "Current" is defined with reference to the time at which an HSI is developed.
"Accepted" is defined as a practice, method, or guide which is (1) documented in the human factors
literature within a standard or guidance document that has undergone a peer-review process, and/or
(2) justified through scientific/industry research practices.
The PRM developed to achieve this commitment contains eight elements. Each consists of an overall
objective and factors that must be considered in the review process. A very brief description of each
element follows. A more complete description along with specific review criteria for each element
can be found elsewhere.2O
Element 1: Haman Factors Engineering Program Management - To assure the integration of HFE
into system development, an HFE Design Team and an HFE Program Plan should be established to
assure the proper development, execution, oversight, and documentation of the program. As part of
the program plan an HFE issues tracking system (to document and track resolution of problems,
concerns, issues) should be established.
Element 2: Operating Experience Review - The accident at Three Mile Island in 1979 and other
reactor incidents have illustrated significant problems in the actual design and the design philosophy
of NPP HSIs. There have been many studies as a result of these incidents and utilities have
implemented both NRC mandated changes and additional improvements on their own initiative.
Problems and issues encountered in similar systems of previous designs should be identified and
analyzed so that they are avoided in the development of the current system or, in the case of positive
features, to ensure their retention.
Element 3: System Function Requirements Analysis - System requirements should be analyzed to
identify those functions which must be performed to satisfy the objectives of each function area.
System function analysis should: (1) determine the objective, performance requirements, and
constraints of the design; and (2) establish the functions which must be accomplished to meet the
objectives and required performance.
Element 4: Allocation of Function - The allocation of functions should take advantage of human
strengths and avoid allocating functions which would be adversely impacted by human limitations. A
structured and well-documented methodology of allocating functions to personnel, system elements,
and personnel-system combinations should be developed.
Element 5: Task Analysis - Task analysis should provide the systematic study of the behavioral
requirements of the tasks that the personnel subsystem is required to perform in order to achieve the
functions allocated to them. The task analysis should: (1) form the basis for specifying the
requirements for the displays, data processing and controls needed to carry out crew tasks; (2)
provide one basis for making design decisions; e.g., determining before hardware fabrication
whether system performance requirements can be met by combinations of anticipated equipment,
332
software, and personnel; (3) assure that human performance requirements do not exceed human
capabilities; (4) be used as basic information for developing procedures, and (5) be used as basic
information for developing staffing, skill, training, and communications requirements.
Element 6: Human-System Interface Design - Human engineering principles and criteria should be
applied along with all other design requirements to identify, select, and design the particular
equipment to be operated/maintained/controlled by plant personnel.
Element 7: Plant and Emergency Operating Procedure Development - Plant and Emergency
Operating Procedures should be developed to support and guide human interaction with plant
systems and to control plant-related events and activities. Human engineering principles and criteria
should be applied along with all other design requirements to develop procedures that are technically
accurate, comprehensive, explicit, easy to utilize, and validated.
Element 8: Human Factors Verification and Validation (V&V) - V&V evaluations should assure that
the performance of the HSI achieves, when all elements are fully integrated into a system, (1) all HFE
design goals as established in the program plan; (2) all system functional requirements, and (3) all
requirements to support human operations, maintenance, test, and inspection task accomplishments.
Four types of evaluations should be performed:
1. Human Factors Issue Resolution Verification - All issues documented in the Human
Factors Issue Tracking System of Element 1 should be resolved.
2. HSI Task Support Verification - All controls, displays, alarms, and data processing that are
required to accomplish human safety-related tasks and actions should be available.
3. HFE Verification - All controls, displays, alarms, and data processing support provided by
the HSI should be appropriate to the crew tasks and designed according to accepted HFE guidelines,
standards, and principles.
4. Integrated System Validation - The integration of HSI elements with each other and with
personnel should be validated through dynamic task performance evaluation. The evaluations should
have as their objectives: (1) demonstrating the adequacy of entire HSI configuration for achievement
of safety goals, (2) confirmation of function allocation and the structure of tasks assigned to
personnel, (3) adequacy of staffing and the HSI to support the staff in the accomplishment of their
tasks, (4) adequacy of procedures, (5) confirmation of the adequacy of the dynamic aspects of all
HSIs for task accomplishment, and (6) evaluation and demonstration of tolerance of the design to
human error and system failures.
ADVANCED HSI DESIGN REVIEW GUIDELINE
Guideline Development
While the PRM addresses the design process, guidance is needed to support the review of detailed HSI
design products of that process (as part of PRM Element 8 described above). The Advanced HSI
Design Review Guideline was developed to provide these review criteria and was intended to update
the available CR review guideline.2 In the discussion below, the term "Guideline" (with a capitol "G")
refers to the entire document, while the term "guideline" refers to the individual guidelines within the
document. A more detailed description of the Guideline development and contents is available
elsewhere.21
Based upon an evaluation of research and industry experience related to the integration of personnel
into advanced systems, a set of High-Level Design Review Principles was developed (see Table 1).
These principles provide the generic HSI characteristics necessary to support operator performance
and make systems more tolerant to human errors when they occur. Since these principles are stated
at a fairly general level, they were further developed to a level of detail sufficient to support HSI
review and evaluation. The principles were translated into terms that could be applied to specific
applications by developing guidelines for the review of the specific types of technology (e.g., graphic
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displaysandexpertsystems).
Table1. High-Level Design Review Principles
Category
General
Primary Task Design
Secondary Task Control
Task Support
l'r|nc|p_!e
gafety, Cognitive Compatibility, Physiological Compatibility, Simplicity
3f Design, Consistency
gituation Awareness, Task Compatibility, User-Model Compatibility,
Organization of HSI Elements, Logical/Explicit Structure, Timeliness,
2ontrols/Displays Compatibility, Feedback
=ognitive Workload_ Response Workload
Flexibility, User Guidance & Support_ Error Tolerance & Control
The effort to develop detailed guidelines began with an identification of existing human factors
guidance documents for advanced HSIs. Through a review of the human factors literature,
approximately 50 guideline efforts were identified. To identify those that would serve as the
"primary sources" for the Guideline, a high priority was given to establishing the validity of the prior
guidelines; i.e., assuring that they were based upon empirical research and/or accepted human
engineering practice. Validity was defined in terms of two aspects of document development.
"Internal" validity was evaluated by the degree to which the individual guidelines within a document
were based upon empirical research and provided an audit trail to that research. "External" validity
was evaluated as a function of the degree to which the guidelines were subjected to independent peer
review. The peer review process was considered a good method of screening guidelines for
conformance to accepted human engineering practices. In general, documents which had strong
validity were considered primary source documents to serve as a basis for the Guideline.
The guidelines from the primary sources were edited to combine similar guidelines and to transform
the material into a standardized format. Where compound guidelines were encountered (several
guidelines in a single statement) an effort was made to break them into logical units and represent the
units as separate guidelines. Conflict resolution between guidelines was handled on a case-by-case
basis.
Guideline Description
The guidelines were organized into seven major sections which are described below. Each of these
sections contains a set of general guidelines and more detailed guidelines addressing specific HSI
implementations, techniques, and formats.
Information Display - This section deals primarily with the formatting of text and graphic visual
displays. Guidance is provided in top-down fashion beginning with display formats (such as
topology displays and trend graphs), display format elements (such as labels, icons, symbols, color,
coding, etc.), data quality and update rate, and display devices.
User-System Interaction - This section addresses the modes of interaction between the operator and
the HSI. Topics include dialog format, navigation, display controls, entering information, system
messages, prompts, and system response time. This section also contains guidelines pertaining to
methods for ensuring the integrity of data such as inadvertent change or deletion of data,
minimization of data loss due to computer failure, and protection of data such as setpoints.
Process Control and Input Devices - This section addresses information entry, operator dialog,
display control, information manipulation, and system response time. Considerations of
display-control integration are also included here.
Alarms - This section is currently a place holder for the results of another NRC research project to
develop review guidance in the area of advanced alarm systems.
Analysis and Decision Aids - This section addresses the use of knowledge-based systems.
334
Inter-Personnel Communication - This section contains guidelines for activities related to speech and
computer-mediated communication between plant personnel, e.g., preparing, addressing, transmitting
and receiving messages.
Workplace Design - This section addresses the organization of displays and controls within individual
workstations and control room configuration and environment.
In addition to a hard-copy document, the Guideline has been developed as an interactive, computer-
based review aid. Each guideline in the database is represented by several primary fields: guideline
number, rifle, guideline statement, additional information, and source (link to primary source
document). Other user assistance fields are also available, e.g., to provide location (in the document)
information and a note pad for users to append comments related to specific guidelines. The
interactive document will facilitate review planning, guideline access and evaluation, data analysis, and
report preparation. Guideline maintenance such as editing and the incorporation of new guidelines
as they become available is also supported. Availability of the Guideline on a portable computer will
also facilitate in-the-field reviews. An Apple Macintosh TM computer and Hypercard TM software were
selected for prototyping. The prototype user interface provides for many document functions such as
instant table of contents (ToC) access, context index, glossary, and place markers. Users can
automatically go to desired sections by clicking on the ToC or index.
CONCLUSIONS
A framework for the review of ACRs has been developed. Safety evaluations are based upon the
information from both the design process and its products. The PRM provides criteria for the review
of the design process and the Guideline provides criteria for the review of the HSI resulting from the
process. This framework is being used to support the NRC reviews of the HFE programs for the
current ACR designs being evaluated for design certification.
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